



Log of the
NAVAL WARFARE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION



ENGAGE!

NAVAL WARFARE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION

www.warfareofficers.net.au

formerly
The Anti-Submarine Officers' Association,
and incorporating
The Saint Barbara Association—Australian Division

Patron
VICE ADMIRAL C.A. RITCHIE AO RAN (Rtd)



THE OBJECT OF THE ASSOCIATION

“To preserve, promote and foster amongst its members, by such means as the Committee may from time to time deem appropriate, the spirit of patriotism, loyalty and service to the Nation and the Navy enjoyed by members during their period of service and to perpetuate the spirit of comradeship so generated.”

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NWOA Social Events 2015
(Effective 24 Feb 15)

Date	Day	Time	Activity	Venue	Remarks
15 Apr	Wed	1200 TBC	Lower Deck Club (DC) luncheon	TBA	POC CAPT Paul Martin 9498 5169
25 Apr	Sat	0830	ANZAC Day March followed by AGM	Sydney/MV Proclaim	POC CMDR David Flakelar
25 Apr	Sat	0945	CBR ANZAC Day March followed by Lunch	Yacht Club, Yarralumla	POC CAPT Steve Hooke (Rtd) See Note 6.
29 Apr	Wed	TBA	PWO 51 Graduation	HMAS WATSON	Selected invitees only
9 May	Sat	1200	Coral Sea Commemorative Lunch	Aust National Maritime Museum	NOC Function - POC John Hazell – 02 9968 1477 – jhhazell@optusnet.com.au Nomination form on NWOA web.
29 May	Fri	1300	NWOA Mess Dinner	HMAS WATSON	CANCELLED see notes
19 Jul	Sun	1200	BBQ	RSYS	POC CMDR Richard Tighe
14 Aug	Fri	1800	Mess Dinner - Victory in the Pacific	HMAS WATSON	10 NWOA seats allocated POC CMDR David Flakelar
19 Aug	Wed	1200	LDC luncheon	TBA	POC CAPT Paul Martin 9498 5169
21 Oct	Wed	1200	LDC Luncheon	TBA	POC CAPT Paul Martin 9498 5169
30 Oct	Fri	1200	Annual NWOA Lunch	HMAS WATSON NB venue change	CN Guest speaker POC CMDR David Flakelar
Nov-Dec		TTBC	Scrap Iron Flotilla Mess Dinner	NUSHIP ADELAIDE (TBC)	Limited nos. only POC CMDR David Flakelar
13 Nov	Fri	1830	Sydney - Emden Mess Dinner	HMAS WATSON	10 NWOA seats allocated POC CMDR David Flakelar
25 Nov	Wed	1200	Canberra Chapter annual lunch	TBA	VADM Johnston guest speaker POC CAPT Steve Hooke

Notes:

1. NWOA have had to cancel their annual Mess Dinner at WATSON due to lack of support from NWOA members, and not meeting the minimum numbers required by WATSON. However XO WATSON has kindly offered 10 positions at two of their Mess Dinners for NWOA members. NWOA Secretary is the POC and will advise when bookings are open on a first come basis.
2. NWOA are opening up our social events for attendance by Naval Officers' Club (NOC) and Lower Deck Club (LDC) members as numbers permit, with NWOA members having priority if required. Similarly NOC and LDC have kindly opened up their social events for attendance by NWOA members if there is space available.
3. Should you wish to attend these functions, please contact the POC nominated in the remarks column and regularly check the NWOA website for updates.
4. This is a first call for those of you in the region to join the Naval Warfare Officers Association contingent for Anzac Day in Canberra this year. The NWOA will be marching and will be lead this year by our Patron, VADM Chris Ritchie.
5. The RSL has promulgated a detailed program and related administrative arrangements on their website. These include both the Dawn service and the National service at the War Memorial, as well as matters such as road closures, free parking at Russell with shuttle bus services etc.
6. **NWOA Canberra Program**
Please note the following key program timings particularly relevant for NWOA members:
1000-1015 Muster centre strip of Anzac Parade, near the Blamey Cres intersection lights. The NWOA is Contingent Number 35,
1045-1145 Veterans' March. Seating available o/c to attend the national service in front of the AWM.
1145-1230 National Anzac Day Service
O/C Reunion lunch, Yacht Club, Yarralumla.



President's Report March 2015

A busy year for the ANZAC Centenary is well underway. Towards the back end of last year Navy stole the limelight in Albany in recognition of the departure from there to Gallipoli, shortly after CN and the Governor General were on Cocos Island commemorating the Sydney Emden battle. The Centenary now turns to ANZAC Day and it will be a big one, I recommend attendance at the March in either Sydney or Canberra this year. The AGM will be held onboard MV Proclaim amidst the delights of Sydney Harbour and our annual reunion in Sydney. Please see the Flyer for details of the March.

In an endeavour to boost our social programme much has been done to work with other organisations so both can take advantage of the camaraderie on offer. A full social programme is published on the website and I encourage as many as possible to take advantage of it, either as a group or as an individual. On the social side regrettably we have had to cancel the May mess dinner that was being supported by WATSON. The lack of numbers attending the dinner means it is not viable to be conducted as an officially sanctioned function. It's disappointing that we as an Association could not support this activity as it was an opportunity to meet with the new PWO course and welcome them to the fold. Nevertheless the social programme does highlight other events at WATSON that are available to the NWOA to attend. I thank the XO WATSON for this opportunity. This year the annual Sydney luncheon has CN as guest speaker. Unfortunately the RSYS was not available, and so we have booked the RAC club at circular quay as an alternate venue. Regrettably numbers attending this event have been steadily reducing over recent years so we are hoping for your support to this year's events, especially from the serving members.

Over recent months a lot of work has been done on the website and I commend it to you. As you know Engage is now largely distributed electronically. You will receive an alert as to its release but if per chance any member does not have regular access to the Internet it is possible to get a printed version snail mailed to you. Please contact David Flakelar, our hard working Secretary who will arrange this.

Finally, as part of natural succession there will be a few vacancies on the Committee from April next year. The work done by the Committee keeps the Association alive and I want to thank those involved for their efforts. We are constantly on the lookout for new committee members to make a difference. Please see anyone of us if you are interested. It would be greatly appreciated.

Hope to see as many as possible at the ANZAC Day marches and functions.

Yours Aye
Davyd Thomas

Honorary Life Members (In alphabetical order)

Peter Cosgrove, Guy Griffiths, John Holman, David Leach, David Price, Brian Robertson, Ray Williams



Editor's Comment

'Engage Magazine', March 2015

Welcome to my second edition of the *Engage Magazine*. Firstly, I would like state that I was underwhelmed by those that chose not to join the debate on theme "What is a "Warfare officer"" But not all is lost, I am more than happy to leave this as an open ended debate and will publish those courageous enough to put pen to paper. *The Captains Diary* continues with tales from the *Tartan Terror*, but leading this edition of Engage is the presentation given by RADM Jonathon Mead in Perth last year at the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.

Australia is a direct descendant of the greatest maritime power of the time; the United Kingdom. From the arrival of the first fleet in 1788 to federation in 1901, Australia benefited from its defence being underwritten by the Royal Navies command of the seas. This allowed the new country focus on its internal development, even with federation and the assumption of defence at the national level and post-world war one, Australia would pursue a defence posture as part of the imperial defence system. Additionally, Charles Beans creation of the 'natural soldier'; the diggers roots to the outback and coupled with the sacking of the very new and proven Royal Australian Naval Fleet by the Washington Naval Treaty any realisation of a national maritime obligation and strategy were dashed. To put frankly, the scuttling of the *Australia* has enabled an enduring national malaise; 'chronic sea blindness'.

The maritime narrative has always been a limited conversation, since the federation as noted by Fredrick Eggleston "...we do not have that sense of the sea and our surroundings which is generally developed in an island people..." However, as with the language of geo politics, Australia has reenergised its dialogue on strategy. Firstly, the Australian Chief of Army has stated on multiple occasion that "...*While many of Mahan's insights are today of primary historical value, his assertion that the oceans of the world constitute ubiquitous highways are so profoundly obvious as to conceal its genius...So our (Australia's) survival, even in peace time, depends on the sea...*" This is rare language from a soldier who has argued that the Australia's collective 'sea blindness confounds him and other defence leadership. Lastly, The Australian Chief of Navy has stated that the current academic discourse in strategy has not hoisted in key aspects of the contemporary geopolitical circumstances. CN Griggs insists that the term Maritime strategy would benefit from being referred to as "...*an integrated maritime strategy...*"

Therefore, to maintain the conversation on contemporary Maritime thought; RADM Mead asks the question; is there a case for Indian Ocean exceptionalism? His speech at IONS overviewed the fundamentals of the geopolitical realities in Australia's Western Ocean, identifying that with no overarching security architecture the Indian Ocean is vulnerable from non-traditional security agenda items, such as climate change, through to the higher end of the military spectrum such as piracy, narco-terrorism and the disruption of trade on the high seas. But his paper offers a conceptual framework for naval cooperation within IONS over a five-year period that would see maritime forces collaborating via a sub-regional construct.

Lastly, the *Captains Diary* this edition focuses on the challenges of new media and an aspect to command that drives messaging sometimes to be short, direct and unambiguous. CO of the *Tartan Terror* succinctly walks us through the potentially negative, but demonstrates the unbridled positivity if we harness new media and the advantages that brings coupled with proven internal messaging of the deck plates.

Welcome onboard.

Commander Sean Andrews, Canberra, Mar 15

Naval Cooperation in a Sea of Anarchy

RADM Jonathan Mead, AM RAN

Of the great oceans in the world, the Indian Ocean stands apart. It is small in size, long seen by some as of lesser importance than its Pacific and Atlantic cousins, but how times have changed. With over 40 per cent of the world's population calling this ocean home, and as power balances have shifted from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Ocean is now centre-stage of global geo-politics. What is striking about the Indian Ocean is its diversity; states that adjoin this ocean are differentiated by their varying political ideologies, by the God they pray to, by the language they converse in, by their history and their race.

Despite all this, the 'Indian Ocean world' has one common feature, the sea, which to use a Mahanian expression, forms a 'great highway' bridging together continents and islands. Notwithstanding the heterogeneous nature of the region, and setting aside for one moment the debate over a common set of values, what we do know for sure is that each state that identifies itself as belonging to the Indian Ocean has a direct interest in the ocean and what it delivers. That said, the ocean that we are dependant upon for our survival and prosperity can, in an instance, also destroy us. In recent years alarm bells have rung loudly, as the region has struggled to deal with a never-ending stream of security challenges. One by one they have come, sometimes trickling in, sometimes in a deluge, and these have ranged from climate change and natural disaster, through to people smuggling, transnational crime and economic security. For many a year, good order at sea was, in a sense, an oxymoron in the Indian Ocean. And the manner by which nations deal with these security challenges is made more difficult by the anarchical nature of the high seas.

In the face of a growing realisation that action was needed, a sister to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was born in 2008 when naval chiefs of the region came together in New Delhi to form the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Clearly, a central plank to IONS is naval cooperation; the thinking being that the sum is greater than its constituent parts. How naval cooperation may best be progressed is the main theme of this paper; and in order to provide some context, a snapshot of a handful of maritime issues confronting the region might set the scene.

Tragedy of the Commons

In the middle of the Indian Ocean, situated just north of the One and Half Degree Channel, rests the beautiful and tranquil island chain of Maldives; Asia's smallest and least populated nation, it is also the world's lowest lying country. With over 90 per cent of its tax revenue generated by tourism, Male is almost entirely dependant on the sea, or more accurately, the sea-level. Climate change and resultant inundation from rising sea-levels poses the single greatest threat to the security of the Maldivian people. Every year around May, storm clouds, laden with rain, form in the Arabian Sea. Observed by sailors for thousands of years, this weather phenomenon is the life-force of India's agricultural industry. Strong moist winds strike the southwest Indian coast in early June bringing with it essential rainfall. Gathering strength, the monsoon spreads across the Deccan Plateau and up into the Indo-Gangetic Plain, ending near the Himalayan Ridge. Over half of India's population live off the land and are dependant on the monsoon for the water it brings and the subsequent nourishment of food crops. Nature has, at times, been unkind to the billion or more people calling Hindustan home, as the monsoon infrequently fails to deliver the rain that the plains need so desperately.

On Boxing Day 2004, many miles under the seabed, a tectonic plate near Indonesia slipped. This shift resulted in a tsunami that radiated outwards akin to ripples in a pond. Within hours, over a quarter of a million people perished as powerful waves ripped through coastal villages in Indonesia, Asia, and Africa; all with devastating effect. Tragedy, as it so often does, acts as a rallying cry and in this case the international community moved quickly to assist those states that had lost so much. Rarely does a year go by when we are not confronted by a natural disaster of biblical proportions; Typhoon Haiyan in December 2013 near The Philippines is a case in point.

In street jargon, the expression 'what has that got to do with the price of fish' is a dismissive retort to an irrelevant suggestion. But for many states in the Indian Ocean, the price, supply and protection of fish stocks assumes an importance that many in the world fail to appreciate. Smaller states, with limited capacity to police their waters, are vulnerable to poachers who, whilst violating sovereignty, ravage and sack sea-bed resources. The net result of such wholesale destruction requires a regional approach to ensure the longevity of such a precious commodity.

Around the Horn of Africa the scourge of piracy has plagued mariners. Perhaps the most dangerous waterway in the world, shipping has, until recently, been at the mercy of criminal elements operating from Somalia. Whilst it is universally acknowledged that the solution to this problem can only come through political changes to Somalia itself, coalition efforts to stem the tide of piracy-related incidents is only treating the symptoms not the problem itself and the fact remains that Somalia, for the sixth year running, has been labelled as number one on The Fund for Peace *Failed States Index*. For sure an inglorious record, but indicative of the reality that when a country fails it takes significant time and resources for reconstruction to have any meaning. Sadly, piracy is an exportable art, and whilst the Horn of Africa attracts most attention, the waterways in and around the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia have also been hotspots for pirate attacks.

Operating in a similar water space to Somali pirates, but receiving far less media attention, has been the activities of international terrorist organisations using the seas to transport narcotics, weapons and militants from one country to the next. Heroin begins its journey in the poppy fields of Afghanistan, where it is then hauled overland through Baluchistan to the coastline - small skiffs then ferry this product out to awaiting dhows, which then transports millions of dollars in illicit cargo to awaiting criminals abroad. Even more alarming has been the vocal intent of some well known groups such as Al Shabab, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigade, to attack merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Blessed with a sprinkling of good luck, MV *MStar* which was attacked by a waterborne improvised explosive device in the Strait of Hormuz in 2010 was saved by the fact it only partially detonated.

For centuries, trade was ferried from China westwards across the Central Asian Republics to South Asia and then through to Europe. This path, known as the Silk Road, was notable for its strategic importance as the economies of Europe and the Far East were dependant on the free flow of commodities through the route. Nowadays, matters are reversed. Instead of east to west, the trade moves west to east; oil and liquefied natural gas from the Gulf states have replaced spices as the lifeblood of nations, and the Indian Ocean has become the primary medium of haulage. Every day tankers laden with precious oil navigate their way through the narrow chokepoints of the region. Any disruption to the free flow of oil would have a disastrous impact on the global trading regime. Many of the issues previously outlined have potential for naval intervention; whilst others are thornier and require global political action (climate change and rising sea-levels are good examples). That said, navies are renowned for their flexibility, adaptability, poise and persistence, and in times of need they are often the first point of call.

Regional Naval Cooperation

Oceans are anarchical. To be specific, no authority has singular sovereignty of the water space. Of late, the expression 'maritime commons' has come into vogue, denoting that unlike *terra firma*, the sea once past the 200nm limit is everyone's responsibility and at the same time no one's responsibility. Sociologists theorise that when a resource is held jointly, it is in the individual's (read: state's) interest to exploit rather than protect the asset. The turn of phrase 'tragedy of the commons' was even coined to describe this way of thinking.

It is a home truth that IONS countries are almost totally reliant on the commons as a sea-bridge for trade. Putting aside one moment the issues of climate change, pollution, people smuggling, transnational crime, narco-terrorism, natural disaster, food stocks and energy reserves, the clear fact remains that countries within IONS derive their economic prosperity from and through the ocean.

By way of responding to these dilemmas, 26 chiefs of navy of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean region gathered in New Delhi on 15 February 2008 in order to discuss constructive engagement. Hailed as the first new regional maritime security initiative of the 21st century, the conclave sought to address maritime issues pertaining to the region's security, stability, safety and prosperity. Similar to its political sibling, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the progress of IONS initiatives has been tested by the disparate character of the region. Some commentators contend that the Indian Ocean has no distinctive overarching personality. It is true that there is a kaleidoscope of political and non-political structures which cut across the region, many with little connection to the other. When an opportunity arises to bring together some of these institutions, or at the very least introduce a degree of consistency into the region's security architecture, the chance should not be overlooked. Coincidentally, the chair of IORA passed to Australia in late 2013, and with the RAN assuming responsibility for IONS, there has been muted talk about harmonising the two bodies. How we best position the two, whilst IONS is still in its infancy, is the real question. Over the past six years there has been a temptation to mirror the framework of the WPNS and use this as a template for naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Whilst there might be merit in replicating some of what WPNS entails, the history of that construct is very much different to IONS. WPNS was born in the dying years of Cold War mistrust, when identifying a *cause-celebre* in order to bind, then glue disparate nations, was so much easier. Without such an existential threat, and in the absence of a common rallying cry, bringing navies together may require a more sophisticated course of action. Moreover, the geo-political narratives of WPNS and IONS are hardly similar. In the former, alliances and treaties were very much in fashion (indeed they still have much currency today), but in the Indian Ocean, the region is noted by its climate of non-alignment.

Since the last Conclave of Chiefs in 2012, two themes stand out sharply. First, Indian Ocean states have continued to struggle in a depressed global trading environment, and defence funding has naturally been affected. Cognisant that times are fiscally tough, and austerity is the norm rather than the exception, there clearly are benefits to combining maritime efforts. At the very least it will reduce duplication. At its best it will manifest in the usage of naval 'best practice'. Second, the Horn of Africa has become a whole lot safer to navigate around. On this point, a combination of factors including the embarkation of armed security teams on transiting ships, the implementation of best management practices by seafarers and the vigorous prosecution of pirate action groups by CTF 151 (Combined Maritime Forces), CTF 465 (European Union), CTF 508 (NATO) and the independent players around the International Recommended Transit Corridor have seen successful pirate attacks drop to zero. The scoreboard now reads: navies 1: bad guys 0.

Local Naval Cooperation

Maritime security, just like other forms of security, is more often than not directly shaped by distance. Put simply, the closer one is to a threat, the hotter it feels. In the same manner, cooperation between states and navies is also affected by distance. Political scientists have coined the term 'security complex' to describe how countries which are clustered together, tend to have interwoven security linkages - what affects one affects others. By looking at the conundrum of regional maritime security through a reductionist lens and by uniting IONS states into small, manageable, and homogenous components, ones that are generally reflective of the security complex they identify with, may offer a pathway for successful naval cooperation. Fortunately, the original architects of IONS nicely divided the grouping into four geographic sub-regions, these being:

- South Asian littorals - Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles and Sri Lanka
- West Asian littorals - Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen
- East African littorals - Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania
- Southeast Asian and Australian littorals - Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste

Naval cooperation, via military forces, coastguards and police forces, could be based very loosely around these sub-regions as they do offer a host of advantages. First, the sub-regions bring neighbours together. This is essential, because in times of need most states look to their neighbour as the first point of call for assistance. Second, the cost of any interaction is reduced. Navies are expensive, if for no other reason but the high cost of fuel and stores which ships burn and consume. On that note, time, distance and dollars are all proportionally related, and the shorter the transit the cheaper the tasking. Third, states within the sub-regions tend to share similar threat perceptions and hence orbit around each other to form a security complex. For instance, the East Africa littoral might have a focus on counter-piracy measures, whilst the Southeast Asian and Australian littoral might view humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, people smuggling, and trade as their areas of interest. Identification (or more rightly the lack thereof) of a common threat perception amongst states is perhaps the single most important inhibitor for military cooperation. In the absence of a reason to commit forces and resources, the logic underpinning cooperation becomes somewhat anaemic. Fourth, it is an inescapable fact that interoperability becomes more challenging as the number of navies in the collective grows. This difficulty manifests not just at the tactical level, but it persists at the political level as well. This has been a long standing feature of the region where many nations have preferred bilateralism over multilateralism, in particular when it relates to security. Finally, there already exists a level of cooperation between navies within these sub-groupings and thus states could leverage off current cooperative frameworks.

But this should not be interpreted to mean that each sub-grouping would be exclusive, indeed to the contrary. By way of example, the Indian Navy may wish to participate in the Southeast Asian littoral, or the Royal Australian Navy may see benefit in pursuing relationships with the African navies, and there may even be trilateral interaction (India, Australia and Indonesia). This should be encouraged as the end-state is to promote naval cooperation, full stop. Those that have the capacity and the desire to work with other navies and sub-regions should of course do so. Alarmists might assert that the idea of partitioning the collective into four distinct areas is a proxy for establishing spheres of influence. This assertion would be wrong. Bringing like-minded folk together to pursue a cooperative agenda designed to further localised security and stability is, well, commonsense.

Just as IONS has a chairperson who provides oversight of the collective for a two-year period, this concept could be extended to the sub-regions, where coordinators might be appointed biennially to manage initiatives designed to further naval cooperation. Ultimately, what IONS should be looking for, is the development of a naval community, first within each sub-grouping and then finally as a whole: a naval community that has a shared identity and where a high degree of functional cooperation and integration exists. Without overcooking the concept, it is important to understand that the roadmap to establish a naval community will be different for each navy and each sub-grouping. Broadly, the development of these sub-groupings will take time and each will move through a number of phases, though in the main they can be categorised as: nascent, ascendant and mature. It would be right to argue that the starting point for each sub-grouping will be different, in that some of these navies already have a high level of cooperation and integration with their neighbours.

For sub-groupings that are perhaps at the nascent stage, the manner of interaction may best be shaped around confidence building measures, personnel exchange programs, information exchange, and regular dialogue. For others, where the level of communication is more tightly coupled, then cooperation could assume a more advanced hue such as training teams, ship visits, hydrographic assistance, the development of standard operating procedures, sharing of intelligence and senior officer visits. In a mature condition, each sub-region should seek to come together regularly in an operational sense, whether it be through the contribution of naval ships, aircraft or observers, in order to validate, train and exercise in the areas that it has agreed to, or to undertake coordinated patrols or to participate in maritime surveillance. Again, the coordinator of each sub-grouping would take the lead on these initiatives. Mindful that the capacity of varying navies/police forces/coastguards/customs will differ, navies that have the resources to assist fellow navies will be expected to do so. In this manner, Marx's idiom, 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,' is germane.

An IONS Passage Plan

In the early stages of this passage plan, each sub-grouping should pursue an agenda centred on the following aim points:

- maritime domain awareness
- capacity building
- interoperability
- doctrine, strategy, and procedures to address maritime areas of common interest which will be different for each sub-grouping; for example in the South Asian sub-group it might be climate, West Asian energy supply, East African counter-piracy, and Southeast Asian/Australian humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To put it simply, what is needed is a set of standing orders.

Historically, naval cooperation has focused on navy-navy engagement. And of course, this makes sense. That said the breadth and diversity of states that comprise IONS deems a one-size-fits-all-approach somewhat inflexible. More to the point, many states in the Indian Ocean have no navy *per se*, and instead rely on coastguards and police forces to enforce sovereignty, execute government policy, and support the country's maritime interests. Mindful of this, naval cooperation should take on a deeper and more inclusive meaning and embrace all elements that contribute to maritime security.

Navies generally have a reputation for excellence second to none, but in a sense, we have become victims of our own success. A case in point is the ability for shipping to cross the oceans unhindered as they ply their trade - trade that is vital to the economic health of almost all nations in IONS. Yet, the conversation on how best to protect this trade is heavily centred on naval units sanitising chokepoints or sea lines of communication. An enterprise, which IONS could explore, might be to meld the interests of the shipping community with those of naval forces in the region. Such cooperation already exists around the Horn of Africa, where the maritime security centre works in lock step with shipping owners and operators to protect trade as it passes through high-risk areas, and where the confluence of best management practices and naval cooperation has seen a marked drop in piracy. With a view that we do not wish IONS to become too unwieldy, it might still pay dividends for one of the IONS working groups to invite representatives from the commercial shipping fraternity to contribute to the debate.

The success of IONS will rest, to a large degree, on the sense of ownership by its member states. As with any form of collaboration, local sensitivities and national honour percolate to the fore. Perhaps one simple mechanism, which may induce a degree of collegiate consciousness, is an IONS Ensign. Just as all naval, coastguard and police vessels fly their ensigns at sea, navies of the Indian Ocean could similarly fly, when operating together, an IONS Ensign. Such a concept has precedence - members of the European Union fly the EU flag alongside their national flag. An IONS Ensign would not seek to supplant national ideals but rather serve to foster a spirit of brotherhood amongst IONS mariners as they pass in the night.

Sailors understand that bringing together a group of seaman and turning them into a cohesive ships company needs to be done slowly and incrementally. So too with naval cooperation. And just as shipmates learn from each other and gain confidence in each other's skills, navies working together will do likewise. Once an element of cooperative ballast exists, an opportunity may present itself for a coming together of maritime units at the same time and location as the biennial IONS. Under the ethos of IONS, each member state might consider contributing a maritime unit, observer or other. Whilst the naval chiefs are conducting their Conclave, the maritime units would be training alongside in preparation for deployment to sea. The harbour phase would consist of damage control exercises, team building, formal receptions, exercise planning and so forth. Naval units could sail together to conduct basic mariner training and if possible, more focused evolutions such as search and rescue and surveillance.

Using these principles as a guide, and in order to provide a concept of operations on how to move from soft power to hard power cooperation, a broad plan is presented in Table 1.

Timing	Activity
Year 0	Agreement to plan
	Select sub-regional coordinators
	Establish sub-regional websites, managed by coordinators
	Commence dialogue under an IONS framework
	Information exchange
Year 1	Personnel exchange programs
	Senior officer visits
	Training teams
	Bilateral ship visits
	Development of standard operating procedures
Year 2	IONS Conclave
	New sub-regional coordinators selected
	Continued progression of Year 1 activities
	Planning for sub-regional naval gathering (sub-regional coordinators)
	Planning for regional naval gathering (IONS Chair)
Year 3	Sub-regional naval gathering
Year 4	IONS Conclave
	IONS naval gathering
	New sub-regional coordinators selected

Table 1: Campaign Plan for Naval Cooperation

Conclusion

Is the Indian Ocean exceptional? Perhaps not 20 years ago. But as the world's economic epicentre shifts from Europe to Asia, there has been a commensurate swing in importance from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The sea blindness of the past may account for the rather unusual circumstance that it took till 2008 for a maritime security organisation to be stood up in the Indian Ocean region. What is not questioned is the legitimacy of IONS. But the need is surely there. Inevitably, where poverty and a breakdown in governance exist, wrongdoing is not far away, and this idiom has proven itself in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean where piracy, narco-terrorism and transnational crime have proliferated. That said, maritime cooperation has a plethora of other dimensions and these include non-traditional security threats such as climate, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, people smuggling, and search and rescue.

Operationalising naval cooperation within the IONS sphere is no easy task. As Clausewitz eloquently affirmed, war (ergo: the military) is the continuation of policy by other means. Navies have always been a powerful instrument of statecraft, and will continue to be so, and this point adds complexity to the IONS equation. In looking around for precedence in this area, WPNS quickly springs to mind. Whilst I have cautioned about replicating that model, it is reason for pause to note that WPNS has been in existence for 26 years and has 21 participating navies. On the flip side, IONS history is less than 7 years old with 35 member navies. And hence the argument therein that breaking down these numbers into more manageable sizes and coagulating navies into sub-groupings that have shared interests, may have a more successful outcome. By having four loci in the IONS collective, navies can, to begin with, concentrate on areas of cooperation that are important to that region. Over time, as the maturity of each sub-grouping grows, the collective can come together to hone their skills and practice their art.

IONS and naval cooperation are two sides of the same coin. Indeed the legitimacy of IONS will hinge on what can be achieved between navies, coastguards and police forces. This cooperation will not however take place overnight and needs to be mapped out in a logical, non-offensive and sustainable manner. Purists would consider that naval cooperation is about military platforms working and exercising together; yes this is an important tenet, but it is not the core reason why states contribute military forces to work as one. Naval cooperation is, in essence, about promoting collective self-interest over the individual interests of member countries.

There is a Hindustan proverb that runs along the following lines: *Kabhi nao gari par, kabhi gari nao par* [sometimes the boat is on the wagon and sometimes the wagon on the boat]. But the meaning is more poignant: individuals of different rank and qualities have it in their power to help each other. And to some degree, I believe that the IONS navies can draw upon this proverb.

Reprinted with permission from Andrew Forbes (ed), *Protecting the Ability to Trade in the Indian Ocean Maritime Economy*, Sea Power Series No 3, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2014

Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead

Head of Navy Capability (2015 -)



Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1984 and proceeded to sea in 1986 in a variety of ships.

In 1990, he underwent Mine Clearance Diving and Explosive Ordnance training, after which he served as Executive Officer of Clearance Diving Team One. Time at HMAS *Watson* undertaking Principal Warfare Officer training was followed by a succession of warfare postings including Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Officer in HMAS *Melbourne* and HMAS *Arunta*, Fleet ASW Officer and Executive Officer of HMAS *Arunta*.

In 2005, he commanded HMAS *Parramatta* and saw active service in the North Arabian Gulf as part of Operation CATALYST; for this he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia.

He undertook studies at the Indian National Defence College in 2007 after which he assumed the appointment as Australia's Defence Adviser to India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa.

Promoted to Commodore in July 2011, Commodore Mead again deployed to the Middle East where he commanded Combined Task Force 150, responsible for maritime counter terrorism. Upon his return to Fleet Headquarters in 2012, he was appointed the Surface Force Commander.

In January 2015, he was promoted to Rear Admiral in the position of Head Navy Capability.

Rear Admiral Mead holds a Masters Degree in International Relations, a Masters Degree in Management and a PhD in International Relations.

1. AT Mahan *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1918.
2. The monsoon's effects are felt within an area 35N-25S and 30W-170E. See SK Dash, *Climate Change An Indian perspective*, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 19-25.
3. In 1769, 10 million Indian villagers perished in Bengal due to drought and starvation, a direct cause of a weak monsoon.
4. The Indian Ocean region accounts for 60-70 per cent of the world's natural disasters.
5. The Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2013*, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi13>.
6. For the best account of anarchy, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society and World Order*, Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1977.
7. For this idea I have loosely borrowed from Karl Deutsch's 1957 seminal study of security and also Adler and Barnett's model relating to security communities. See E Adler and M Barnett, *Securities Communities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998 and also K Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; international organization in the light of historical experience*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957.

Challenges in Command

Commander Aaron Nye, RAN

These short penned comments are by no means intended to generalise or trivialise the challenges of command at sea but purely reflect my experiences during time in command of *Stuart* to date. I have no doubt that some of my views or perceptions may come across as unpolished and could be debated – but they are mine. Since taking command, HMAS *Stuart* (colloquially known as the '*Tartan Terror*') has conducted an *Operation Resolute* patrol, participated in Exercise *Kakadu* off Darwin, Exercises *Singaroo* and *Bersama Lima* off Singapore, taken part in the Albany Centenary Celebration Event in Albany, conducted a patrol in support of *Operation Saville* (G20 Maritime Patrol) and participated in a 'Freedom of Entry' into our home port of Devonport. After some well earned respite for the crew over RAP, the *Tartan Terror* is now in dry dock conducting a much needed refit.



Tiger 73 (FATCAT) conducting passenger transfers

Firstly, no words or advice can prepare you for the elation one feels when you drive your steamer out of the harbour for the first time. However this sense of personal and professional pride partially gives way to the gravity of responsibility and accountability your position demands. In some ways it was like getting married again. I knew that command – a long-term goal of mine, would cut into my family time; involve a great deal of personal sacrifices and demand a good dose of my emotional energy. It would also, like any marriage, involve a great deal of commitment, some compromises and plenty of healthy communication. I will start off first with communication, with particular reference to social media.

Communication and Social Media

During my hand-over, I was walking around the ship and noticed a group of thirty-odd sailors sitting on the quarterdeck in muted silence pouring over their smart phones (no doubt trolling Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram or Face-timing families and friends). Why don't the sailors just shoot the breeze or chin wag? This is reality – I had to get used to it. This was an aspect to command that would drive my messaging to them to be short, direct and unambiguous. Of note, their reliance on or addiction to internet connectivity and/or the smart phones (devices) has proved frustrating at times and has for the most part provided command with plenty of challenges.

Most Major Fleet Units are now equipped with a small Wi-Fi nodes to enable sailors to connect to the internet and their normal social networks. Although limited in bandwidth, sailors will drag themselves out of their pits in the middle of the night to poke their friends, get their messages and updates during the quieter periods. Any decision to shut this down for extended periods of time can strongly impact on the health and welfare of the individuals and their families. Furthermore, turning it off can at times cause unintended consequences and alarmist reactions from families ashore.

Operational security, especially during both Operations *Resolute* (Border Protection) and *Saville* (G20 Maritime Patrol), understandably was of paramount importance. There were several instances, where it was easier to delay announcing changes to operational tasking until I was certain that we were out of mobile phone range. Where sailors utilise their smart devices (tablets, phones etc) to watch movies, play music and games, it can at times make it a difficult task to confiscate them. As could be expected, we are not the only navy facing the same challenges. My Singaporean and Malaysian colleagues spoke frankly of some of their challenges regarding phone usage, social media and operational security (especially within the Singaporean Navy).

But with or without social media, sailors will always find out what is going on. On the bridge, their running commentary or water cooler buzzes almost always hit the mark and I always feel a little awkward holding off on any news or changes to the program. Beyond the HODs, the not so social media-savvy Chiefs are a useful gauge on how messages should be sold and it is always refreshing to have those robust conversations over a brew. This ensures we all stay on the same sheet of music – an aspect of command that probably never has or never will change.



HMAS Stuart with JS Kirasame enroute to Albany

Furthermore, my crew are not immune to the desire to provide a running commentary on all naval decisions they think are dumb, or on a senior officer's performance across social media (especially on Facebook). Whether or not I personally agree or disagree with their opinion/s, the leadership team frequently have to go to great pains to explain the rules regarding social media and the commentary they provide. Let me say that participation in controversial military social media sites is not encouraged.

Conversely, Social media also allows presentation of positive stories to targeted audiences. Proactive messaging is a powerful shaping tool and the measured use of social media should be seen as an essential part of the suite of communication tools available to Commanding Officers at sea. The centralised and often lengthy clearance process for messages can at times prove frustrating.

Frankly, for lower level messaging, it just plain doesn't work. As commanders we are expected to assess and accept risk where appropriate. We do that with valuable lives and expensive machinery but when it comes to public comment, all trust in the judgement of commanders seems to go out the door. How has Defence arrived at the point when public comment is subject to more risk adverse checklists than the safety and welfare of our most valuable assets?

Use of social media allows for the targeting of very specific audiences, for example, interest groups, friends, family and specialist defence media. It is a valuable and low cost tool for command and presents lots of opportunities for ships companies to manage their own messaging. The nature of social media, with its expanding networks, also provides the possibility of messages to receive exponential exposure as popular posts go 'viral'. This is especially the case for posts which can be shared across a variety of social networking sites, such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. It's a powerful medium and command should be empowered to use it more to benefit the organisation.

Commitment to Technical Knowledge

If it tastes like chicken, smells like chicken it probably is chicken. Sailors can see through fakes and I have always tried to resist the urge to be someone else. But this has limits – when does a commanding officer need to think like an engineer? Where in the past, one did not concern themselves with the technical intricacies and governance of the ship– the 'Rizzo Review', a fall out from the non-availability of the LPAs almost five years ago, demonstrably demanded a change in focus by our organisation and those who command ships at sea.

TM194s (Planned Maintenance Progress Reports), Operational Level Maintenance figures, defect summaries, risk management registers and technical command decision summaries have become just as important as those Report of Proceedings and other operational reports. I often find myself having to go down to look at engine mounts, inspect the rudder post or clamber through mast modules to look at faulty radar feed horns. This shift does not take away or divest my engineers from their normal responsibilities –but is there to complement and provide assurance for them, myself and the organisation. Unintended consequences to this shift are that the stokers and the greenies get a kick out of seeing the boss getting dirty in the spaces.

Compromise for the greater Corporate Need

Naturally, I think the *Tartan Terror* is the best ship in the fleet but not necessarily the most important. I acknowledge for the most part that *Stuart* is often just a dot on some operational headquarters' Power- Point slide somewhere, whether on operational tasking, participating in an exercise or sitting merely alongside. Is this reality? Yes. Is it a difficult concept for some of ship's company to grapple with - yes. My ship's company, especially my Heads of Department, always hate it when the ship gets poached for its people or gets cannibalised for parts to keep another ship on higher priority tasking at sea.



HMAS Stuart participating Bersama Lima 14

Notwithstanding the gnashing of teeth at the personal and the unit level, we seek solace that it is for the greater good and know that another ship will at some point have to do the same for us. Which leads me to another point - resilience of our sailors? As a reflection of our society, the younger generation is less resilient than maybe most of you were at their age. But again, this is not cause to throw our hands in the air and search for a silver bullet. They, for the most part, want to learn and be better. By empowering them with greater responsibility and accountability, I think resilience comes to them in spades. To be fair to those younger sailors, I think we have bigger problems with our organisational resilience and ability to surge in a sustainable fashion.

Promises....I learnt pretty quickly, not to make any promises – especially when it came to the ship's program. In the current fluid strategic and operational environment, it is always easier to plan for the worst and hope for the best. Although difficult at times, bad news or 'pineapples' are best delivered unfiltered. Although not always delivered perfectly or well received, most people understand the rationale if the 'why' is explained. My Chiefs certainly help in presenting those challenges as opportunities between the deck plates. Noting normal short attention spans and my not so-polished oratory skills, I am not a big fan of Clear Lower Decks and prefer to quickly pipe my message over main broadcast before walking the deck plates to answer any specific questions.

Summary

I am privileged to be doing what I am doing and do not take it for granted for one minute. Despite the challenges and opportunities with social media, increasing emphasis on technical integrity and the compromises one needs to make for the greater corporate need of the organisation, command at sea is hard to beat and an awesome privilege – a privilege that I respect. Life at sea has not really changed but the command levers one needs to operate have.

Commander Aaron Nye

Commanding Officer, HMAS *Stuart*



Commander Aaron Nye joined the Navy in 1993 and graduated from the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1995. As a junior officer, he served on a variety of warships before beginning Principal Warfare Officer's Course in 2000, where, on completion, he had the opportunity to serve on exchange in New Zealand onboard the frigate, HMNZS *Te Mana* completing a deployment to the Persian Gulf.

On return to Australia, Lieutenant Nye, served in HMAS *Warramunga* as the Operations Officer. On promotion in 2005, he was appointed as Staff Officer Under Water Warfare in Maritime Development Branch. He assumed command of HMAS *Geraldton* in June 2006 and decommissioned her in October of the same year.

Lieutenant Commander Nye then went onto command ASSAIL SIX (an Armidale Class patrol boat crew) in November 2006 out of Darwin. On completion, Lieutenant Commander Nye then joined Border Protection Command, located at Customs House Canberra as the Operations Officer in 2008.

Completing the Australian Command and Staff Course in 2009, he assumed his position as Staff Officer to Chief Joint Operations the following year. Promoted to Commander in 2011, Commander Nye recently returned from the Middle East having served as Deputy Director of Operations in the Combined Maritime Forces Headquarters, Bahrain. He was appointed Commanding Officer of the RAN Recruit School at HMAS *Cerberus* in January 2012.

Commander Nye assumed command of HMAS *Stuart* in May 2014.

Commander Nye holds a Master of Arts in Strategy and Policy with the University of New South Wales and Master of Maritime Studies with the University of Wollongong. Married to Natalie, they have four children: Adelaide aged 14; Millicent aged 12; Joaquin aged 9; and Byron aged two. CMDR Nye's greatest achievement to date is almost twenty years of marriage to Natalie, who has commendably and almost single-handedly raised their four children his other interests include gardening, bee-keeping and failed attempts at brewing pear cider.

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The Quiz!

Question

1. Before federation in 1901, how many of the self governing colonies operated a Navy?
2. What is difference between a Destroyer and a Frigate?
3. Name the Fleet at the start of World War II?
4. Name the French destroyer and the RAN unit that sank her during the "Battle of Dakar" in West Africa in September 1940
5. *Sydney* was the first Commonwealth dominion aircraft carrier to see wartime service, when did she deploy to Korea? How many sorties did she fly? How many aircraft did she lose? And how many pilots were lost?
6. The four gun line destroyers during Vietnam were? How many miles did they steam and how many rounds did they fire collectively?
7. Name the six ships of the Gulf One War

1. Before the Federation of Australia in 1901, five of the six self-governing colonies in Australia operated a navy, the exception being Western Australia which did not have a naval force. The colonial navies were supported by the ships of the Royal Navy's Australian Station which was established in 1859.

2. The difference between a Destroyer and Frigate is that whilst modern navy combat ships are generally divided into several main categories. Frigate is a name which has been used for several distinct types of warships at different times. It has referred to a variety of ship roles and sizes. From the 18th century, it referred to a ship smaller and faster than a ship-of-the-line, used for patrolling and escort work rather than fighting fleet actions. In modern terminology, the definition of a frigate is a warship intended to protect other warships and merchant marine ships and as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combatants for amphibious expeditionary forces, underway replenishment groups, and merchant convoys. The destroyer is the faster and more maneuverable yet long-endurance warship intended to escort larger vessels in a fleet or battle group and defend the group against a variety of complex attackers (Clear as mud? I can confirm unequivocally that a naval destroyer is not a hoolia hoop with a six inch nail in it)

3. Two heavy cruisers; *Australia* and *Canberra*, both carried 8-inch (203mm) guns and had entered service in the 1920s. Three modern light cruisers; *Hobart*, *Perth*, and *Sydney*, which mounted 6-inch (152 mm) guns and the older cruiser *Adelaide*. Four sloops, *Parramatta*, *Swan*, *Warrego*, and *Yarra*; although only *Swan* and *Yarra* were in commission and lastly five V-class destroyers and a variety of support and ancillary craft

4. On 23 September Australia came under heavy fire from shore batteries, and then drove two Vichy destroyers back into port. Australia then engaged and sunk the destroyer L'Audacieux with eight salvos in sixteen minutes. Over the next two days French and Allied forces exchanged fire; Australia was struck twice and lost her Walrus amphibian

5. The aircraft carrier *Sydney* was deployed to Korea between September 1951 and January 1952—the first carrier owned by a Commonwealth Dominion to see wartime service.^[109] During this time, 2,366 sorties were flown from *Sydney*, with only fifteen aircraft lost and three pilots killed.

6. In their five years of service in Vietnam, the four gun line destroyers; *Perth*, *Brisbane*, *Hobart* and *Vendetta* steamed over 397,000 miles and fired 102,546 rounds.^[109]

7. HMA Ships *Adelaide*, *Brisbane*, *Darwin*, *Success*, *Sydney*, and *Westralia*

Frequently Asked Questions About NWOA

About Us

The Naval Warfare Officers' Association is a social network for past and present Warfare Officers of the Royal Australian Navy. Our purpose is to continue the patriotism, loyalty, friendships and comradeship of Naval Service within the wider community. Further information can be found at our website <http://warfareofficers.org.au/>. If you don't have Internet access please contact Membership Secretary and he will arrange to have your details loaded to the website database.

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The NWOA welcomes those officers qualified in a recognised Naval Warfare course and others who, by reason of their close association with, or interest in, the objects of this Association, the Committee deem to be desirable to be members.

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3. Your application will be automatically sent to members of the NWOA Committee.
4. Pay membership subscriptions as detailed below and notify **Membership Secretary by email** after which you will have full access privileges.
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Naval Warfare Officers' Association

ANZAC DAY 2015

THE MARCH	
MUSTER:	0845 (Banner bearers by 0830 please)
ASSEMBLY POINT:	Corner of King Street and Pitt Street
PLACE IN MARCH:	After Naval Association and before RAN Reserves

REUNION ABOARD “Proclaim” (RADAR is in refit) Guests are very welcome	
BOARD:	Commissioner Steps, Circular Quay at 1100
DISEMBARK:	At Commissioner’s Steps, West Circular Quay at 1530 or At Royal Sydney Yacht Squadron at 1600

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

NOTICE is hereby given that the Sixty Seventh Annual General Meeting of the Association will be held aboard the ferry *Proclaim* on ANZAC Day at 1300
Please submit agenda items to Secretary in writing before COB 17 April 2015.
In our usual brief and informal meeting, business will include the presentation of reports and the election of office bearers and committee members.

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Our financial year ends on 31 March and annual subscriptions for 2015/16 are due for payment- unless you have paid in advance. WWII veterans are honorary members. Check your membership status on our Website.

Members are requested to complete and return the enclosed Subscription and Order Form, together with appropriate payment (or payment can be made on-line). This form makes provision to order copies of CONTACT and the Association tie and to nominate your guests.

CMDR David Flakelar

Hon Secretary

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